One of the many challenges facing financial economists is to distinguish the theories explaining momentum. Brav and Heaton (2002) show that it is very difficult to distinguish the "rational" models of structural uncertainty (SU) from "behavioral" models of conservatism (C). In this paper, I reexamine the SU model and the C model proposed by Brav & Heaton (2002) in explaining short run momentum. Based on simulated data, I find that they differ from each other in the relation between agent's earnings forecast revision and the lagged earnings change. This relation is significantly negative for the SU model and significantly positive for the C model. Empirical evidence provides support for the SU model. *
Introduction
Financial anomalies such as short term momentum 1 and long term reversal 2 in stock returns have intrigued academics and practitioners for a long time. Momentum denotes the evidence that recent performance is positively associated with future stock returns in the short run, typically within one year. Long term reversal denotes the evidence that past long term performance is negatively associated with future returns in the long run, typically over 3-5
years. These anomalies challenge the traditional full information rational expectation (RE) models. To explain these puzzles, many theories have been proposed that relax either or both of the RE models' two key assumptions: (1) investors have complete knowledge of the underlying structure of the economy; (2) they apply Bayesian method in forming their expectations. Among these are behavioral theories 3 and rational structural uncertainty (SU) theories 4 .
Distinguishing these potential theories is very important. It has significant implications on investors' portfolio choices and information disclosure policies. Brav and Heaton (2002) propose a SU model and two simplified behavioral models, a conservatism model (henceforth, the C model) and a representativeness model, to explain those financial anomalies. The C and the representativeness model explains momentum and reversal respectively, while the SU model explains both anomalies. They claim that it is hard to distinguish the SU model from the behavioral models since both can generate similar short run momentum and long run reversal patterns.
Using some implications not considered in Brav and Heaton (2002) , I show that it is possible to distinguish the C model and the SU model in explaining momentum by examining how recent payoff change affects an agent's payoff forecast revision 5 .
As a benchmark, the RE model assumes the agent has complete information regarding the structural changes. If the firm's fundamentals are stable, the RE agent forms her expectation by placing equal weight on all the past data. If there is a structural change, the RE agent discards all the data before the change and places equal weight only on the data after the change. As a result, when the firm's fundamentals are stable, the RE agent's forecast is relatively stable and does not exhibit much overreaction. When the firm's fundamentals change, the RE agent revises her forecast very quickly in response to new information and does not exhibit much underreaction either. Hence, overall, there is no straightforward prediction regarding the relation between the agent's payoff forecast revision and the lagged payoff change.
Similarly, the C model also assumes the agent has complete information about the stability of a firm's fundamentals. However, the agent is subject to the conservatism bias, which refers to her tendency to overweigh her prior and/or the old information and underweigh the new information in forming her expectation compared to optimal full information Bayesian updating. Whether the firm's fundamentals change or not, the agent always underreacts to the new information due to the conservatism bias. Therefore, when the new information is positive, the agent revises her forecast upward, but not to a full extent. This implies that, most likely, the agent will need to revise her forecast upward further next period. Hence the C model predicts that the agent's payoff forecast revision is positively associated with last period's payoff change.
Different from the C model, the SU model assumes the agent does not know if the firm's fundamentals are stable or not. If the fundamentals are unstable, she is not sure when the structural change occurs either. Lacking complete information, the SU agent has to put weight on all the past data with more weight on more recent data. Therefore, when the fundamentals are stable, the SU agent puts too much weight on the recent data compared to the RE agent, resulting in overreaction. On the other hand, if the structural change occurs, she puts less weight on the new data than the RE agent, resulting in under-reaction. At any given time, firms without structural changes most likely exceed firms with structural changes, therefore, the SU agent's overreaction dominates. When the agent overreacts to recent payoff change, she most likely needs to revise her forecast in the opposite direction to correct her overreaction. Therefore the SU model predicts the agent's payoff forecast revision is negatively associated with last period's payoff change. The simulation confirms these predicted differences between the SU model and the C model proposed in Brav and Heaton (2002) .
Empirically, I find the analyst consensus earnings forecast revision negatively associated with the last period earnings change. The result does not depend on whether the mean or the median analyst forecast is used to compute the forecast revision, and is robust to the choice of the sample period. Hence, this evidence supports the SU model. To conclude, I find 
Models
This section describes the models proposed in Brav and Heaton (2002) and explains the implications regarding the relation between the agent's payoff forecast revision and the last period payoff change.
At the beginning of each period t, a single, one-period risky asset A t comes into existence.
The asset pays x t at the end of period t. The payoff, x t , is assumed to be normally distributed with mean µ t and variance σ 2 . The risk neutral representative agent values the asset at the beginning of period t at its expected payoff µ t . She does not know µ t at the beginning of period t but estimates it based on the past t − 1 realized payoffs. Letμ t−1 denote the forecasted payoff at the end of period t, the price of the asset at the beginning of period t is thenμ t−1 in this economy ignoring discount.
An important feature of this economy is the stability of µ t . If µ t is constant over time, the structure is stable, and unstable otherwise. For simplicity, Brav and Heaton (2002) only allow for a maximum of one structural change over a firm's life. The C agent is assumed to have complete knowledge of the stability of µ t . After observing the past t payoffs, the C agent knows whether they are drawn from the same distribution. If they are drawn from two different distributions, she knows exactly where the structural change occurs. Payoffs up to and after the change point r are drawn from two normal distributions with the same variance, but different means. In forming her posterior belief, the C agent is assumed to utilize her knowledge of the structural change but does not apply Bayes rule. By contrast, the SU agent is assumed to have incomplete knowledge about the stability of µ t , but she applies Bayes rule based on her incomplete information.
Definition of underreaction and overreaction
Before providing detailed descriptions of the models, I would like to explain the definitions of underreaction and overreaction in Brav and Heaton (2002) and in this paper. As stated in Brav and Heaton (2002) , overreaction refers to the predictability of good (bad) future returns from bad (good) past performance. Underreaction refers to the predictability of good (bad) future returns from good (bad) past performance. Overreaction can occur when investors put too much weight on recent performance, and underreaction can occur when investors put too little weight on recent performance. In this paper, overreaction refers to the predictability of upward (downward) expectation revision from bad (good) past payoff change, and underreaction refers to the predictability of upward (downward) expectation revision from good (bad) past payoff change since I test the effect of past payoff change on the agent's payoff forecast revision directly.
Full information rational expectation model
As a benchmark, the full information rational expectation (RE) model assumes that the agent has complete knowledge of the structure and applies the Bayes rule in updating her posterior belief. At the beginning of period t = n + 1, the agent can estimate µ n+1 using the observed payoffs of the previous n assets via the Bayes rule. Assuming all of the payoffs are i.i.d., the likelihood function for the past realized n payoffs given µ and σ, is normal as the following: 
The marginal distribution of µ is in the form of a Student's t-distribution. The riskneutral RE agent values the asset at the mean of this marginal distribution, given by:
Note that the estimated mean of the payoff distribution is a weighted average of the prior mean µ 0 and the sample meanx n , where the weight is a function of the precision parameter κ 0 and the number of relevant observations n. If there is a structural change, Equation (1) will only be applied to payoffs after the change since the RE agent has complete knowledge of the change. Assuming no discount, the price at the beginning of period n + 1 is the same asμ n since there is only one risk neutral representative agent in this economy.
Conservatism (C) model
We denote a behavioral model motivated by the conservatism bias as the C model. Conservatism denotes a psychological heuristic documented in the literature of psychology [e.g., Edwards(1968) ] where base rates (prior beliefs and/or older data) are overweighed and new information is underweighed. In Brav and Heaton (2002) , the C agent (Beh-C) is assumed to have complete knowledge of the structural stability; however, she does not apply the Bayes rule in updating her belief. Specifically, the C agent's posterior belief is a weighted average of the RE posterior belief and her prior mean as the following:
where c > κ 0 and subscript C denotes conservatism. Although Equation (2) is also a weighted average of the agent's prior belief µ 0 and the sample meanx n , the condition c > κ 0 ensures that the C agent always overweigh her prior belief compared to the RE agent.
In Equation (2) , all of the relevant information is treated equally. This reduces the volatility of the estimates since the extreme payoffs is balanced by all the past payoffs. The weight on the prior, c c+n , decreases with the number of realized payoffs n, and the weight on the sample mean, n c+n , increases with n. Thus, as the number of payoffs increases, the estimate gradually converges to the true mean by the law of large numbers. When there is a structural change, only the information after the change will be utilized in the estimation because the C agent has complete knowledge of the change. Hence, the weight on the prior belief shortly after the structural change is very high as the number of relevant payoffs is small. As a result, the C agent exhibits underreaction to the structural change. When there is no structural change, the weight on the prior is still higher than the optimal weight due to conservatism bias. This leads to an overall underreaction pattern and implies a significantly positive relation between the agent's expectation revision and the lagged payoff change.
Rational structural uncertainty (SU) model
In the SU model, the agent applies Bayes rule in updating her belief but has incomplete information about the structure. She is not sure if and when a structural change occurs; hence, her payoff forecast depends on the perceived location of the change. Let r denote the point after which the change occurs and p 0 (r) denote the agent's uniform prior probability 6 of the change point r such that P n r=1 p 0 (r) = 1. Subscript 0 indicates a prior probability assigned before any payoffs are observed. At time t = n, given the prior probability p 0 (r) and the realized n payoffs, x 1 , · · · , x n , the SU agent forms the posterior probability, p n (r), for all the possible change point r ranging from 1 to n. Given r, the agent believes that the payoffs, x 1 , · · · , x r , were drawn from a normal distribution with mean µ A and the other payoffs, x r+1 , · · · , x n drawn from a normal distribution with mean µ B and the same variance.
If r = n, the agent believes no structural change has occurred and all of the n payoffs were drawn from the same distribution with mean µ A .
Assigning informative prior to µ A and µ B and a prior that they are independent conditional on σ 2 , Brav and Heaton (2002) show that, given n observed payoffs, the posterior distribution of the change point r is
, where
The posterior probability of the change point r ∈ {1, . . . , n} is obtained by integrating the joint posterior probability over the unknown parameters µ A , µ B , and σ 2 , and the result is:
The marginal distributions for µ A and µ B 7 are as the following:
The marginal distribution for µ n is then:
where the first part represents structural instability concerns and the second part indicates structural stability concerns. Brav and Heaton (2002) show that the SU agent's estimate of µ n is given by:μ
+p n (n) 7 See detailed derivation of the marginal distributions in Smith (1975) .
wherex n−i is the sample mean of the most recent n − i payoffs. Equation (3) is a weighted average of the conditional Bayesian estimates, where the weights are given by the posterior probabilities of all the possible change point.
Note that the SU agent's estimate nests the RE agent's estimate. If the SU agent has complete information about the exact change point location, the SU estimate reduces to the RE estimate. However, since the SU agent has incomplete information, she needs to consider all the possible change points, including the possibility of no change. Hence, she always considers all the past information even if the information before the change should be discarded when there is a change. This leads to underreaction to the structural change.
In addition, the SU agent always puts more weight on more recent payoffs due to instability concerns. To see this, we collect the items from Equation (3) and get the weight placed on the observation j ∈ {2, ..., n} in the estimateμ n as
which strictly increases with j. The weight of the first observation is simply
The intuition is conditional on the change point, only the payoffs after the perceived change point enter the conditional Bayesian estimate. Therefore, given n observed payoffs, the i th payoff is relevant whenever the perceived change point r is less than or equal to i. For example, the n th payoff will be counted n times since it is relevant to the estimation over all the possible change point r = 1, · · · , n. Hence the more recent the payoff is, the more times it is counted in the posterior mean and the more weight it receives.
This feature leads to overreaction to the new information during stable periods. Had the SU agent known that the structure was stable, she would have treated all the past payoffs equally instead of overweighting more recent payoffs. Since each firm has a maximum of one change over its life, the number of firms experiencing structural changes is lower than the number of firms in stable periods. This conjecture is confirmed in the simulated data. On average, only about 5% of the firms in the top and bottom payoff change deciles experience structural changes. Therefore the SU agent's overreaction to stable firms dominates her underreaction to instable firms. As a result, we shall observe an overall overreaction pattern for the SU agent cross-sectionally. This implies a significantly negative relation between the SU agent's expectation revision and the lagged payoff change, which is confirmed in Section 3.
Simulation Results
This section replicates the sample paths of the estimated mean as shown in Figure 2 
Relation between lagged payoff change and payoff expectation revision
To verify the predicted difference between the two models in terms of the relation between the lagged payoff change and the agent's expectation revision, I simulate 3000 independent sequences of 50 payoffs each and compute the agent's expectations for the C agent and the SU agent using Equation (2) and Equation (3) respectively. Note that negative estimates make the computed expectation revision, the percentage change in the estimates, meaningless. At the end of period t + 1, the agent's expectation revision of future payoff for firm i is defined as
The standardized earnings change 9 (SEC) for firm i at the end of period t is defined as
where σ it is the standard deviation of the last four x it − x it−1 . At the beginning of each time period, I sort the 3000 firms into deciles based on the firms' lagged SECs. The decile with the highest (lowest) SECs is called the winner (loser) group. The agent's expectation revision for each firm is computed and averaged within the winner and the loser group. Figure 2 shows the cross-sectional average of the SU agent's expectation revisions for the winner and the loser group as well as the difference between them. One striking observation is that the average expectation revisions for the winner group lie below the loser group almost everywhere. As shown in Table 1 , the time series means of the cross-sectional average revisions for the winner and the loser group are −.15% and .26% respectively. The mean revision for the winner-minus-loser group is −.41%. The mean revisions for the three groups are all statistically significant at the 5% level. These results confirms the prediction that the SU agent tends to overreact to the SEC measure on average.
The potential explanation of the above findings is that there are two types of firms in the winner and the loser SEC deciles. One type consists of firms experiencing structural changes, and the other consists of stable firms with extreme lucky or unlucky random draws.
Furthermore, the number of stable firms exceeds the number of firms experiencing structural changes 10 . For stable firms, the SU agent tends to overreact since she overweighs the new information due to instability concerns. However, for firms experiencing structural changes, the SU agent tends to underreact because she also allocates weight to the irrelevant data before the structural change due to stability concerns. Both overreaction and underreaction occur for the same reason -incomplete information of the structure, but they apply to different types of firms. Since stable firms exceed firms experiencing structural changes, the SU agent exhibits overreaction to the SEC measure on average. Two factors contribute to the domination of stable firms in the extreme SEC deciles. One is the assumption that each firm has at most one structural change over its life. The other is that the SEC measure does not contain much information about a structural change.
The results documented in Chan (2003) can actually be explained by the above results for the SU model. Chan (2003) separates firms into two groups: one with news (news group) and the other without news (no-news group). He then applies price momentum strategy to the two groups separately and finds that momentum profit only exists in the news group.
For the no-news group, he finds short term reversal instead of short term drift predicted by C model. The extreme price movements accompanied by news reflect structural changes more than extreme random draws, while the extreme price movements not accompanied by news, similar to the SEC measure, reflect extreme random draws more than structural changes. If that is the case, the SU agent's overreaction to stable firms and underreaction to firms experiencing structural changes explains why the momentum strategy only works in the news group but not in the no-news group.
The cross-sectional average of the expectation revision for the winner, the loser and the winner-minus-loser groups for the C model is shown in Figure 3 . Contrary to the pattern for the SU model shown in Figure 2 , the mean revisions of the winner group always lie above those of the loser group. As shown in Table 1 , the time series means of the cross-sectional average revisions for the winner and the loser groups are 0.07% and −0.17% respectively.
The mean revision for the winner-minus-loser group is 0.23%. The average revisions for the three groups are all statistically significant at the 10% level. These results indicate that overall the C agent underreacts to the SEC measure.
The explanation for the above results is that since the C agent has complete information of the structure, she knows if the firms in the extreme deciles are experiencing structural changes or not. If the firm is stable, she does not overreact to its recent payoff. Since all relevant data are weighed equally in her estimate, her response to the most recent extreme payoffs is moderated by all the past data. This reduces the effect of recent extreme payoff on the her expectation. In fact, her weight on the new information is still low compared to the RE agent during the stable periods. For firms experiencing structural changes, the C agent discards the irrelevant information before the change just as the RE agent does. However, she dogmatically places more weight on her prior belief, leading to underreaction to firms experiencing structural changes. Hence, the C agent overall exhibits underreaction to recent extreme performance.
In sum, this analysis shows that the SU model can be successfully differentiated from the C model 11 .
Pearson's correlation coefficient
In addition to examining the expectation revision for stocks in the extreme SEC deciles, I
also examine if the difference between the SU model and the C model shown in Section 3.2. 
Fama-MacBeth regression
I also apply Fama-MacBeth 12 regression method to the simulated data. It confirms the difference between the two models. At each time period, I run a cross-sectional regression of the agent's expectation revisions for the 3000 firms on the firms' lagged SECs. The coefficient on the lagged SEC is significantly positive for the C model and significantly negative for the SU model. As reported in Table 2 , the time series mean (t-value) of the coefficients on the lagged SEC is −.0008 (−6.35) for the SU model and 0.0004 (5.52) for the C model. Same as the correlation coefficient, the signs of the regression coefficients are more relevant than the level.
Robust check
All the three methods detailed in previous sections show that the two models are distinguishable. To check the robustness of the difference, I perform Monte Carlo simulation.
Specifically, I simulate 100 data sets using the set of parameter values that was used to generate the results shown in previous sections. It turns out that every one of the 100 data sets produces the predicted difference between the SU model and the C model for the other sets of parameter values are qualitatively the same, i.e., every one of the 100 data sets produces sharp difference between the two models 13 .
In sum, the robust check shows that the combination of the agent's payoff expectation revision and the lagged payoff change serves as a good metric to differentiate the two models.
The agent's expectation revision directly relates to the models and provides a direct way to test how the agent's form her expectations. The payoff change is independent of the type of the agent and is easy to measure empirically.
Empirical Tests

Data and methodology
In this section, I examine the empirical relation between the agent's expectation revision and the lagged earnings change. I find a significantly negative relation consistent with the prediction of the SU model. Therefore this evidence supports the SU model.
I use the analyst consensus earnings forecast 14 revision to proxy for the agent's expectation revision in the simulation. The empirical counterpart of the SEC measure is computed 13 The Monte Carlo simulation results for the other sets of parameter values are available upon request. 14 Quarterly earnings forecast is used in the revision computation since it is widely known that long term analyst forecast is more subject to career concern biases. as the standardized difference between two consecutive reported quarterly earnings,
where σ iq is the standard deviation of the last four e iq −e iq−1 , and "emp" denotes "empirical".
Like the SEC measure in the simulation, the empirical SEC measure is more closely related to random draws than to structural changes. This is a reasonable conjecture since we typically assume earnings follow seasonal random walk and measure earnings news by the standardized seasonal difference in earnings. For each fiscal quarter, firms are required to file an earnings report with the Securities and Exchanges Commission within 90 days from the fiscal quarter end. In the middle of each month, the I/B/E/S summary file reports the analyst consensus forecast for the unreported fiscal quarter. Therefore for each fiscal quarter, there is a consensus estimation in each month before the firm reports the actual quarterly earnings. If the firm reports quarterly earnings at the end of a month, there would be a consensus estimation in the middle of the same month. To reflect the immediate effect of the last reported earnings on the analyst consensus estimation for the next fiscal quarter, the earliest consensus estimation for each fiscal quarter is extracted from the database.
I scale the difference in analyst consensus estimations of the next quarterly earnings by the closing price on the last consensus estimation date. I call it the earnings forecast revision.
In the simulation, I can choose the parameter values such that the agent's expectations are all positive to make the computation of expectation revision meaningful. However, in empirical data, the analyst consensus estimation can be negative. That is why I scale the difference between two consensus estimations by the closing price on the previous consensus estimation date. The empirical SEC measure is computed as the actual quarterly earnings change scaled by the standard deviation of the previous eight earnings changes, excluding the current earnings change.
In each consensus estimation month, I run a cross-sectional regression of the analyst consensus forecast revision against the lagged SEC (Lag SEC). As firms have different fiscal quarters and report earnings in different months, I have 214 consensus estimation months over the whole sample period. The time series average of the cross-sectional coefficients on the lagged SEC is −0.00046 and the t-statistic is −2.6 as reported in Table 3 . I also run a multiple regression of the earnings forecast revision against the lagged SEC and the current SEC in each consensus estimation month. The coefficient on the lagged SEC is still significantly negative with a mean of −0.00031 and a t-statistic of −1.89. Both the simple and the multiple regression show that the analyst consensus earnings forecast revision is negatively correlated to the lagged SEC. In Table 3 , the earnings forecast revision is computed using the mean analyst consensus estimation. I also used the median analyst consensus estimation to compute the earnings forecast revision. The regression results are almost identical to those reported in Table 3 . To check if the negative relation is driven by a particular sample period, I also run the regression using subsamples by dividing the whole sample into two halves. The first half is from May 1987 to December 1997 and the second half covers the rest.
The results are qualitatively the same. The coefficients on the lagged SEC are significantly negative in both subperiods with the second half exhibiting a much stronger overreaction as reported in Table 4 15 .
The significantly negative relation between the earnings forecast revision and the lagged SEC in the empirical data coincides with the findings of the SU model in the simulated data. It shows that on average an analyst tends to overreact to the most recent earnings data when forming her estimation of the next quarterly earnings. This empirical evidence provides support for the SU model.
Conclusion
This paper shows that the SU model and the C model proposed in Brav and Heaton (2002) can be distinguished from each other using the right metrics. Empirical evidence provides more support for the SU model. Using simulated data, I find the relation between the agent's earnings forecast revision and the lagged earnings change is significantly negative for the SU model and significantly positive for the C model. Using empirical data, I find that the analyst consensus earnings forecast revision is significantly negatively related to the lagged earnings change. This result supports the SU model. and the t-statistics of the cross-sectional average expectation revision for the winner group, the loser group and the winner-minus-loser group. I simulate 3000 independent firms with 50 payoffs each. Each firm has a randomly assigned change point that is uniformly distributed between 1 and 50. If a structural change occurs, the mean of the payoff distribution switches between 11 and 7. The direction of the change is also uniformly distributed for each firm. The agent's expectations are computed using the conservatism model. At the beginning of each period, the 3000 simulated firms are ranked into deciles in ascending order based on the firms' previous standardized earnings changes (SEC). The winner (loser) portfolio consits of stocks in the bottom (top) SEC decile. The portfolios are held for one period after the ranking. The agent's revision in expectation in period t is computed asμ t /μ t−1 − 1, and the standardized earnings change for firm i in period t is defined as
where σ it is the standard deviation of the last four x it − x it−1 . In order to ensure positive estimates, the parameter values used in the simulation are: µ 0 = 10, κ 0 = 1, v 0 = 40, σ 0 = 15, µ A = 11, µ B = 7, σ = 2, c = κ 0 + 5. Table 2 : A cross-sectional regression is estimated each period of the expectation revisions of the individual firms on the firms' lagged standardized earnings change (SEC). The reported statistics are the means (x1000) and the t-statistics of the time series of the coefficients from the period-by-period regressions. To get the simulated data set, I simulate 3000 independent firms with 50 payoffs each. Each firm has a randomly assigned change point that is uniformly distributed between 1 and 50. If a structural change occurs, the mean of the payoff distribution switches between 11 and 7. The direction of the change is also uniformly distributed for each firm. The agent's expectations are computed using the conservatism model. At the beginning of each period, the 3000 simulated firms are ranked into deciles in ascending order based on the firms' previous standardized earnings changes (SEC). The winner (loser) portfolio consits of stocks in the bottom (top) SEC decile. The portfolios are held for one period after the ranking. This figure shows the time series of the average earnings expecation revision after the ranking for the winner portfolio, the loser portfolio and the winner-minus-loser portfolio for the SU model. The agent's revision in expectation in period t is computed asμ t /μ t−1 − 1, and the standardized earnings change for firm i in period t is defined as
where σ it is the standard deviation of the last four x it − x it−1 . In order to ensure positive estimates, the parameter values used in the simulation are: µ 0 = 10, κ 0 = 1, v 0 = 40, σ 0 = 15, µ A = 11, µ B = 7, σ = 2, c = κ 0 + 5. I simulate 3000 independent firms with 50 payoffs each. Each firm has a randomly assigned change point that is uniformly distributed between 1 and 50. If a structural change occurs, the mean of the payoff distribution switches between 11 and 7. The direction of the change is also uniformly distributed for each firm. The agent's expectations are computed using the SU model. At the beginning of each period, the 3000 simulated firms are ranked into deciles in ascending order based on the firms' previous standardized earnings changes (SEC). The winner (loser) portfolio consits of stocks in the bottom (top) SEC decile. The portfolios are held for one period after the ranking. This figure shows the time series of the average earnings expecation revision after the ranking for the winner portfolio, the loser portfolio and the winner-minus-loser portfolio for the SU model. The agent's revision in expectation in period t is computed asμ t /μ t−1 − 1, and the standardized earnings change for firm i in period t is defined as
where σ it is the standard deviation of the last four x it − x it−1 . In order to ensure positive estimates so that the computed expectation revision is meaningful, the parameter values used in the simulation are: µ 0 = 10, κ 0 = 1, v 0 = 40, σ 0 = 15, µ A = 11, µ B = 7, σ = 2, c = κ 0 + 5. Figure 3 : I simulate 3000 independent firms with 50 payoffs each. Each firm has a randomly assigned change point that is uniformly distributed between 1 and 50. If a structural change occurs, the mean of the payoff distribution switches between 11 and 7. The direction of the change is also uniformly distributed for each firm. The agent's expectations are computed using the conservatism model. At the beginning of each period, the 3000 simulated firms are ranked into deciles in ascending order based on the firms' previous standardized earnings changes (SEC). The winner (loser) portfolio consits of stocks in the bottom (top) SEC decile. The portfolios are held for one period after the ranking. This figure shows the time series of the average earnings expecation revision after the ranking for the winner portfolio, the loser portfolio and the winner-minus-loser portfolio for the SU model. The agent's revision in expectation in period t is computed asμ t /μ t−1 − 1, and the standardized earnings change for firm i in period t is defined as
where σ it is the standard deviation of the last four x it − x it−1 . In order to ensure positive estimates, the parameter values used in the simulation are: µ 0 = 10, κ 0 = 1, v 0 = 40, σ 0 = 15, µ A = 11, µ B = 7, σ = 2, c = κ 0 + 5. Figure 4 : I simulate 3000 independent firms with 50 payoffs each. Each firm has a randomly assigned change point that is uniformly distributed between 1 and 50. If a structural change occurs, the mean of the payoff distribution switches between 11 and 7. The direction of the change is also uniformly distributed for each firm. This figure shows the time series of the cross-sectional Pearson correlation coefficients between the agent's expectation revision and the lagged standardized earnings change (SEC) for both the SU model and the conservatism model. The agent's revision in expectation in period t is computed asμ t /μ t−1 − 1, and the standardized earnings change for firm i in period t is defined as
where σ it is the standard deviation of the last four x it − x it−1 . In order to ensure positive estimates, the parameter values used in the simulation are: µ 0 = 10, κ 0 = 1, v 0 = 40, σ 0 = 15, µ A = 11, µ B = 7, σ = 2, c = κ 0 + 5.
